Why did Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refuse to negotiate on Six Points [after] the 1970 election?

score:1

Accepted answer

As for Sisson and Rose, this how they cover the (final) two days of negotiations:

Proposals were advanced on behalf of the Awami League by Kamal Hossain and were discussed in substantial detail. They were in essence an explication of the six-point scheme. The central government was to oversee defense, foreign affairs (excluding foreign aid and trade), and finance and commerce (excluding currency) and was to receive a fixed proportion of revenue from each province. The provincial governments were to enjoy powers to be specifically granted by the interim instrument, which would include authority to negotiate for and receive foreign aid directly and to trade with any country. Each province would have a reserve bank, and any interprovincial currency transfers would have to be approved by the government of the province from which the transfer was being made. Provincial governments alone were to be empowered to levy income tax. The government team, while agreeing that an interim constitution should address these substantive issues, reserved judgment on the Awami League's more specific proposals, indicating that it needed to study them further.

The meeting, described by one government negotiator as extremely long, involved, and exhausting, was continued the next morning. The Awami League began by explicitly summarizing the points it had enumerated orally the previous evening. The teams then decided that the draft proclamation should be prepared, which, once a consensus was reached on all items, would serve as the vehicle for the transfer of power. The government team encouraged its Awami League counterpart to prepare the original drafts, including what had been agreed upon as well as its more specific demands with respect to the distribution of power. The Awami League refused, insisting that since the proclamation would derive its authority from the existing regime and would be promulgated by the president, it was appropriate that the president's team prepare the drafts. The league was fearful that anything it committed to paper and submitted for ratification would immediately be declared unacceptable, and could be leaked and used for propaganda purposes by its foes. Its representatives wanted the provisions, regardless of their origin, to appear as though they had the sanction of the governmental team. The league would then prepare amendments and propose editorial changes in "revised" drafts as necessary.

The presidential team prepared a draft the same day, incorporating those items suggested by the Awami League with which they felt comfortable and including a provision for presidential emergency powers, since the authority of martial law was to be re­moved. The principle elements of the draft proclamation were as follows: (1) martial law would be ended effective with the administration of the oath of office to provincial cabinets; (2) the Provisional Constitutional Order of 4 April 1969 would serve as the fundamental law until a new constitution became effective; (3) Yahya would continue as president during the interim period; (4) the president would exercise power as authorized by the Provisional Constitutional Order and the 1962 constitution; (5) a central cabinet would be selected from among the representatives of East and West Pakistan; (6) the National Assembly was to function as prescribed under the 1962 constitution except for "limitations and modifications to be agreed upon with respect to the Province of East Pakistan"; (7) the functions of the provincial assemblies would be the same as under the 1962 constitution, again with exceptions made for East Pakistan; (8) provincial governors would be appointed by the president in consultation with the leaders of parliamentary groups of the provinces and were to hold office during his pleasure, while a cabinet of ministers was to be appointed with a chief minister at its head to "aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions"; (9) within seven days of the creation of the provincial governments, two constitutional committees would be established—one in Dhaka and one in Islamabad—for the purpose of "formulating special provisions and requirements of each province of Pakistan to be incorporated in the constitution to be framed by the National Assembly," which would be convened by the president after the committees had completed their work; and (10) "whenever it is made to appear to the President on a report from the Governor of a Province or otherwise, that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Province cannot be carried on, the President may by Proclamation assume to himself all or any of the functions of the executive government of the Province."

Sisson and Rose however also consider that the presence of the Yahya's economic team meant that he entered negotiations in detail on the economic autonomy:

The seriousness and the authenticity of the negotiations were emphasized by two responses. First, the leaders of all the West Pakistani political parties decided to journey to Dhaka. Second, and most important, the president summoned his chief economic adviser, M. M. Ahmed, and two of his associates to Dhaka to help the presidential negotiating team establish what was economically feasible in the division of economic power between the central and provincial governments—-the next step in the negotiations.

OTOH a point missing (AFAICT) from Raghavan book is that the government's economic team led by M. M. Ahmed rejectected some of the substantive points of the League's economic proposals, but accepted others:

The government's position on the difficult issues of economic and fiscal policy and power was by all accounts ably and creatively presented by M. M. Ahmed, the president's chief economic adviser. Ahmed argued that the provision that foreign aid and trade be under provincial control without significant qualification was unacceptable, unworkable, and was in fact unnecessary to realization of Awami League objectives—the equitable distribution of foreign exchange earnings and foreign aid and the ability to seek imported goods at the most favorable terms available. Foreign aid, he argued, was a political process involving sovereign states and international lending agencies, whether they be states, consortia of states, or the World Bank. If policies were not coordinated, it would be impossible for any Pakistani province to bargain effectively. The World Bank, for example, would deal with only one government under the constitution anticipated there would be four "sovereignties" in the west and one in the east. It would jeopardize all of their interests to expect international lenders to change their policies in this regard. [...]

Ahmed also opposed the suggestion that the provincial governments collect all customs and taxes. He insisted that the central government had to have autonomous sources of revenue to support federal projects. In the case of customs, for example, the administrative problems in the west would be particularly complex. With one port in West Pakistan, how would the ultimate destination of all imported goods be determined so that the officials of the appropriate provincial government could levy and collect the payment of duty? Would there be common duties or variable duties? How would accounts be kept and payments of duty made on interprovincial trade in goods of foreign origin? Ahmed again proposed that in principle a formula guaranteeing revenues to the central government be adopted for the allocation of taxes and customs, but that the existing arrangements continue in the interim.

The government agreed to the Awami League demand for the establishment of separate provincial accounts of foreign exchange earnings, a simple enough task, and indicated that an appropriate agency of the provincial government could monitor disburs*m*nts from them. The government team also accepted the Awami League proposal for a separate reserve bank for East Pakistan, but noted that because of the commitment to a common currency and monetary policy a federal reserve board would be necessary. These arrangements on economic policy were agreed to by both the government and the Awami League teams, and there is no indication that they were opposed by the People's Party. The PPP's reservations about the six points, especially those concerning aid and trade, had in fact been met.

But otherwise Sisson and Rose describe the breakdown of the negotiations as over the same concerns of wording (of non-economic matters)

Three provisions in the Awami League draft caused considerable consternation among the government team, one in particular because of both its substance and its timing. Each of these provisions held important symbolic meaning for the members of the government team, if not for the Awami League as well. First, the teams had agreed that members of the National Assembly would meet initially in two "Constituent Committees for the purpose of formulating special provisions and requirements of each province of Pakistan after which they would convene as the National Assem ­ bly to draft a national constitution." In its draft the Awami League had substituted "Constituent Conventions" for "Constituent Committees" though their purpose was unchanged. The second provision concerned the nature of the oath under which members of the National Assembly were to be sworn into office. The government's oath emphasized sovereignty and obligation to the state, but the Awami League's version emphasized obligation to the constitu­tion.

Each of these changes became magnified in the judgment of the government team as a consequence of a third and final change. At what appeared to be the end of the discussions, a member of the Awami League team indicated that he had been instructed by Mujib to change "Federation of Pakistan" to "Confederation of Pakistan." At this suggestion one distinguished member of the government team temporarily lost his usually calm demeanor. Jumping from his seat, he exclaimed that a confederation was in essence an agreement between two sovereign states, and that such an arrangement had not even been intimated, much less discussed, before. He said that the word "Union"—if the Awami League was so intent upon using the Indian constitution as a model—was acceptable, but that "Confederation" was inimical to the welfare of the Pakistani state and was completely out of the question. Another member of the government team observed, however, that the Awami League could amend its own draft in any way that it saw fit and that the government then had the prerogative of either agree­ ing or disagreeing. For a third member, this change, timed as it was in the context of the other proposals, served as final confirmation of a long-held suspicion that the Awami League was not negotiating in good faith. Instead of seeking clarification, he accepted the meaning of "Confederation" as defined by the first government member. The third member furthermore felt that his own team was too exhausted to reopen the issues or further contemplate the Awami League's motives and intent.

Although the PPP did not object to the six-point provisions as encompassed by the amended draft, the party took strong exception to the provisions for transfer of power. In their next meeting with the president's team, Bhutto and his aides argued that the lifting of martial law without a meeting of the National Assembly would deprive the central government and its officers of authority and could lead to "constitutional secession." Such an arrangement would be tantamount to yielding to a demand for two Pakistans. The argument was the same as that of Justice Cornelius, though Bhutto emphasized the possible consequence of such an outcome in terms of the army's deepest fears. Bhutto later recalled his position as follows:

Martial Law was the source of law then obtaining in Pakistan and the very basis of the President's authority; with the Proclamation lifting Martial Law, the President and the Central Government would have lost their legal authority and sanction. There would thus be a vacuum unless the National Assembly was called into being to establish a new source of sovereign power on the national level. If, in the absence of any such national source, power were transferred as proposed in the provinces, the government of each province could acquire de facto and de jure sovereign status.

All the sources cited by Sisson and Rose for the above (except the Bhutto book) are their own interviews with the West Pakistani negotiating team, conducted by the authors in 1979. (As you can see however, the exact names of the negotiators/sources are anonymized in the passage(s).) Sisson and Rose do not cite any of the League team for this material.

There is one more interesting titbid in there on the last day

Discussions continued on 24 March, but with a sense of distance and foreboding. Wali Khan and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo met briefly with Mujib in the morning, reportedly in an effort to encourage him to withdraw the proposal for two separate constituent conventions and the reference to the state as a "Confederation." Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan of the Council Muslim League met with Khondikar Mushtaq, a senior leader of the Awami League with personal ties to Muslim League leaders in the west, who indicated a meeting was being held at Mujib's house. He shared Shaukat's premonitions about military action and pleaded that the West Pakistani leaders make Yahya "see sense." Shaukat also spoke with Mujib by phone several hours prior to the scheduled departure of the leaders for Karachi to inquire if a delegation might not again meet with him to discuss matters. Mujib responded that it would not be worthwhile; he could not guarantee its safety, he had "lost" in a vote to compromise on constitutional issues, and he was not sanguine about the outcome of the efforts to reach an acceptable constitutional settlement. They should leave, he said, since it would be difficult to distinguish between friend and foe if force were resorted to. In his dramatic way Mujib told Shaukat "we might not meet again in this world, but we surely will in heaven."

So apparently Mujib claimed there was an internal vote in the League on those sticking/wording points that prevented him from conceding. (Source cited for that is like for the rest/most of that chapter "Interviews, Pakistan, 1979".)

I don't find it too improbable that such a vote might have been held since the four additional points that the Mujib (publicly) raised on March 6 "revocation of martial law, return of troops to the barracks, inquiry into the recent incidents of firing, and immediate transfer of power to elected representatives" had apparently been discussed "by the Awami League’s working committee on [the same day]", according to Raghavan's book (which does make use of some Bangladeshi sources). On the other hand, Raghavan mentioned no collective decision on these other points of contention that remained unsolved on March 24.

Upvote:-2

Politicians, despite the popular caricature of them as lying rogues have to balance many factors. This might mean a certain position they outlined last week was no longer tenable and a new avenue or several had opened up. Because of the deterioration of our public sphere, as noted by many commentators, this does not often come through. Everything has become a bit too tabloidish.

Of course, many politicians are lying rogues. For example, Bo Jo who was making merry whilst the Queen, mourned the passing of Prince Phillips all alone as per govermental guidelines for COVID-9. And he has the nerve to call himself a conservative. No doubt the palace would not have liked to have him at the Cathedral service but royal protocol had to be followed.

Upvote:0

Probably not fully answerable without access to some archives that are not open, but it seem that Mujib changed/hardened his position while in prison (in 1969), owing to even more radical elements taking over the tip of movement in his absence.

On 21 February 1969, Ayub Khan announced that he would not contest the next presidential election. By so doing, he hoped to calm temporarily the opposition and the army, and to use the interregnum to influence the election of an appropriate successor.

The same day, Mujib was released from prison. Ayub’s subsequent attempts to forge a political consensus through a roundtable conference came to naught. At their very first meeting, Mujib made it clear that he would settle for nothing less than his six points.“There was no give and take in his points,” Ayub despondently noted. He shrewdly observed that Mujib “was greatly under the influence of extremists in his party and the students who were completely out of control.” Indeed, soon after his release, Mujib had been feted with a massive rally organized by the students at Dhaka’s Race Course grounds; more symbolically, Mujib was conferred with the title “Bangabandhu” (Friend of Bengal). The students’ eleven-point program, which was rather more radical than Mujib’s six points, had been reiterated at that meeting. By acknowledging the students’ demands and by opting to ride the wave of radicalism triggered by their protests over the past months, Mujib circumscribed his bargaining position vis-à-vis the West Pakistanis. Thenceforth, the six points became the minimum acceptable outcome for the Bengalis rather than being a maximum opening bid that could be diluted during the course of negotiations.

Likewise on the campaign trail he was all about the six points:

From the outset, Mujibur Rahman was confident that he would win 80 percent of the vote in East Pakistan. By October 1970, he believed that his party would carry 140 of the 163 seats in his province. Even this proved to be a conservative estimate. The Awami League’s electoral success was in no small measure due to its superb organizational machinery staffed by student volunteers. His campaign trail encompassed fifty-five cities, every district headquarters and subdivisional town, and nearly 400 thanas, or police administrative units. According to one estimate, “Sheikh Mujib addressed over 30,000,000 people . . . a figure representing almost half of the total population of East Bengal.” Underlying Mujib’s campaign was a single, carefully constructed narrative that drew on Bengal’s long catalog of grievances—economic and political, social and cultural. At the official launch of the Awami League’s campaign, Mujib declared that the forthcoming elections should be treated as a “referendum” on his six-point program. The struggle for autonomy, he observed, was closely linked to the struggle for establishment of “workers’ and peasants’ rule in the country.”

Insofar as possible, Mujib wished to avoid a total breach with West Pakistan. The students and the younger Awami League cadre were more vocal about their willingness to consider outright independence. But the gap—between Mujib’s propensity for constitutional methods and desire for autonomy, and the students’ impatience with prim politics and inclination toward independence—was narrow, not least because of the constraining influence of the students’ radicalism on Mujib. By this time, Mujib and his close associates were clear that if the West Pakistan leadership refused to concede the substance of the six points, the only alternative was an all-out struggle for independence: “Six points; if obstructed, one point” was the refrain of the Awami League leadership.

Asked by an American diplomat in January 1970 what would happen if the constitution could not be framed within 120 days, Mujib shrugged his shoulders: “We will try. We will try. If we cannot agree, then we cannot agree.” Ten months later, he was more candid. The Awami League, he stated, was preparing a draft constitution based on the six points that he would present to the constituent assembly. He was willing to be flexible on “less important matters,” but virtual economic independence for East Pakistan was non-negotiable. “This was the last chance, he [Mujib] said, and alternative to acceptance [of] East Pak [Pakistan] demands would be ‘civil war’ . . . While he and [the] Bengalis would prefer to remain peacefully in one Pakistan, their patience was now exhausted and there were other options.”

After the cyclones in late 1970 and the very limited aid from West Pakistan

In a tough but measured statement, Mujib ventilated the anguish and anger of the people of Bengal. Describing the devastation as a “holocaust,” he condemned the government’s response as “criminal negligence.” The destruction wrought by the tidal bore had brought into sharp focus “the basic truth that every Bengali has felt in his bones, that we have been treated so long as a colony and a market.” Mujib declared that “we must attain full regional autonomy on the basis of the 6-point/11-point formula.” When queried by a foreign correspondent if his statement could be read as a call to independence, Mujib responded, “No, not yet.”

So whatever concessions he might have seemed to make in late 1970 or early 1971, (i.e. after winning the elections but when he was denied the right to form the government) would have been rather difficult in view of his earlier (and rather constant) public inflexibility on the six points.

But there isn't much public indication of that even after the election. Although in public Yaha seemed to favor a compromise, this was made rather difficult by Bhutto's party statements, which the Awami League felt like publicly rebutting

Bhutto fired his opening salvo at a victory procession in Lahore on 20 December. “Punjab and Sindh are the bastions of power in Pakistan,” he declared. “Majority alone does not count in national politics.” In subsequent speeches, he asserted that his party was the “sole representative of the people of West Pakistan,” that the PPP and the Awami League had to reach an agreement on the quantum of autonomy to be devolved to the provinces, and that he would not allow anyone to “chisel us out” of power and responsibility. Bhutto’s stance deeply disconcerted the Awami League. Despite winning an overall majority at the polls, the Bengalis feared that the ruling elites of West Pakistan would prevent the convening of the National Assembly. A strong rejoinder was drafted by the party’s constitutional expert, Kamal Hossain, and was issued by the general secretary and Mujib’s principal lieutenant, Tajuddin Ahmad. The statement clarified that the Awami League was vested with a “clear electoral mandate” and was competent to frame the constitution and form the government “with or without any other party.” The Awami League also conveyed its views to an aide of Bhutto’s: “Bengalis are no longer prepared to accept the dictates of the military-bureaucratic establishment for whom Bhutto is a spokesman.” If the latter tried to impede the six-point program, the Bengalis would “stand up and resist to a man.”

[...] On 12 January 1971, Yahya arrived in Dhaka. The purpose of the trip was to ascertain Mujib’s stance on the six points, and, more subtly, to elicit his views on the form and composition of the future government. After a succinct reprise of the six points, Mujib asked the president to outline his objections to them. Yahya’s response indicated the regime’s approach to dealing with the Awami League: avoiding a direct showdown but constraining their options by using the PPP. Thus, Yahya claimed that he had no objections to the six points, but Mujib would have to carry the West Pakistan leaders with him. [...]

In his public remarks, though, Yahya oozed reasonableness. He expressed satisfaction at the discussions with Mujib and referred to the latter as “the future Prime Minister of Pakistan.” [...]

The PPP delegation arrived in Dhaka on 27 January. After two sessions of negotiations, it became clear that there was little progress. The Awami League team insisted on the six points as the basis for a new constitution; the PPP harped on socialist policies but had no concrete alternatives to present. [...]

On 15 February, Bhutto declared that his party would not attend the National Assembly unless there was “some amount of reciprocity” from the Awami League. A constitution based on the six points, he claimed, could not provide a “viable future for the country.” He had gone the distance to meet the Awami League’s position and believed there was “hope for understanding.” It was now for the Awami League to demonstrate flexibility. Looking back years later, a close aide conceded that “there can be little doubt” about Bhutto’s “collusion” with Yahya from January to March 1971.

The Awami League leadership was concerned about the link between Bhutto and the regime. They were apprehensive that “Yahya, even while going ahead with [the] March 3 date, will move promptly thereafter to postpone further meetings for several months in view of non-attendance by West Pak[istan] MNAs [Members of National Assembly] and lack of consensus on constitution.” Mujib was convinced that Bhutto “could not possibly have acted on his own” and that he was supported by the military.

For its part, the Awami League began consultations with leaders of other Western parties, seeking to alleviate their concerns about the six points. At the same time, Mujib carefully tended to his own constituencies. In a memorial service for the martyrs of the language movement, he declared that “no power on earth could subjugate the Bengalees [sic] any more.” In subsequent speeches, he warned against any attempt to throttle the wishes of the people: “We will die but we will not surrender.” In so doing, Mujib sought at once to signal the Awami League’s resolve to the regime and to rein in the more militant sections of his supporters. The latter—mostly students—were convinced that Bhutto and Yahya would never allow the Bengalis to hold the reins of state. They believed, therefore, that the Awami League must issue a unilateral declaration of independence. However, Mujib felt that they should avoid taking any step that would allow the government to pin the blame on the Awami League and so justify a military crackdown. It would be better to allow the negotiations to play out, even if they were doomed to a dead end.

[...] The pent-up pique against Mujib led to an explosion of presidential temper on 20 February: “I am going to sort out that bastard [Mujib],” Yahya declared at a meeting. He was now considering postponing the National Assembly. When reminded that it could lead to military action, Yahya said, “So let it be.”

So yeah, for a couple of weeks maybe in March 1971 Mujib no longer explicitly emphasized the six points in public, but used more vague expressions of determination. Alas that book doesn't detail in what way the League sought to "alleviate concerns" about the six points in the talks held with the other parties then. But it seems a bit unlikely they'd have been willing to concede a lot. Nor was a lot of flexibility conveyed to the US; instead they were probed how they'd feel about Bangladesh declaring full independence, while reasserting the essence of the economic separation/autonomy:

In the first week of February, Mujib had sent a feeler to the American consulate in Dhaka exploring the possibility of the United States playing a mediatory role if the Awami League declared independence. The consul general, Archer Blood, politely indicated that the United States wished Pakistan to stay united and that it was loath to involve itself in Pakistan’s internal affairs. When meeting the American ambassador later that month, Mujib emphasized that “he did not want separation but rather he wanted a form of confederation in which the people of Bangla Desh would get their just and rightful share.”

[...] As the US embassy in Pakistan grimly observed, “Question now is whether Yahya or Mujib will blink first—or whether neither will blink. Showdown cannot be put off much longer.”

After some (simultaneous) inflamatory public declarations by both sides on March 6, Yahya did however signal more privately (by a telegram) to Mujib that he was willing to negotiate. Also, on March 14 Bhutto gave a speech in which he suggested a sort of division of power

Speaking at a large rally [on March 14], Bhutto called for a transfer of power to the Awami League in the East and the PPP in the West. The two parties would then frame a “comprehensive” constitution for Pakistan. The Urdu press quoted him as saying “Idhar hum, Udhar tum” (We here, You there).

Yahya then went to Dakha for a 2nd time on March 15. After a couple of days of impasse over the revocation of martial law during which

Yahya told Tikka Khan, “The bastard [Mujib] is not behaving. You get ready.” While the plan for military action was being finalized, the negotiations continued.

somehow that was side-stepped by deferring the analysis of that problem to an external law expert. After which Bhutto was called in by Yahya, arriving on March 19. The negotiations then progressed to the level of some drafts, apparently along the lines suggested by Bhutto in terms of immediate (local) power division, but after a 3-way meeting (Yahya, Mujib, and Bhutto on March 22) then the negotiations broke down again, seemingly over details in wording...

At the meeting with Yahya’s team on 23 March, the Awami Leaguers presented their draft proclamation. They were informed that the president’s chief economic adviser M. M. Ahmed and other experts had been flown in to examine the economic and financial provisions of the Awami League’s demands. The ensuing discussions with Ahmed went surprisingly well: experts on both sides found that their differences, though real, were not unbridgeable.

However, differences on other matters persisted. The presidential team took particular exception to two provisions of the Awami League’s draft. Where their draft had spoken of two “constituent committees” for writing the provincial constitutions, the Awami League’s draft called them “constituent conventions.” Furthermore, the latter mentioned that after the provincial constitutions were framed the National Assembly would meet to draft a constitution for the “Confederation of Pakistan.” These changes were semantic rather than substantive. Mujib had wanted the term “confederation” mainly as a genuflection to popular sentiment in the province, especially the young militants. In fact, the draft envisaged federal as opposed to confederal interim arrangements. It explicitly granted powers to the central legislature to make laws for the “Islamabad Capital Territory and Dacca Capital Territory.” In any event, when the presidential team contested these as “fundamental” changes, the Awami League team said that the issue was negotiable between Mujib and Yahya. Nevertheless, the president’s team seized upon these as confirmatory evidence of the Awami League’s perfidy. The stage was now set for military action.

Later that night Yahya Khan summoned the leaders of smaller West Pakistan parties who had arrived in Dhaka a couple of days ago. [...] Sensing that military action was afoot, the[ese] leaders implored Yahya not to resort to any hasty or irrevocable steps. At least one of them pointedly asked Yahya to extricate himself by transferring power to the elected representatives. By contrast, Bhutto and his party leaders concluded that “military action was necessary.” The chairman conveyed the message to Yahya on the morning of 24 March. [...]

So yes, Yahya did accuse the League of changing their position on some (wording) stuff more proximately to the breakdown of the negotiations near the end of March, but on the other hand, it seem it was Yahya who had seemingly given a bit more ground by discussing the economic autonomy in concrete terms, at level of technical experts. Although it's more debatable if he really intended to grant it, or was just buying time for the final preparation of a military solution, which Bhutto seems to have preferred. As for the aftermath:

[...] At the final meeting on the evening of 24 March 1971, the Awami League negotiators asked Peerzada [one of the negotiators on Yahya's team] when the draft would be finalized. [...] He said that the time of [the next] meeting would be intimated to Kamal Hossain by telephone. [...]

By this time, the preparations for military action were well under way. Following the meeting with the Awami League on 23 March, Yahya [had] decided to set the plan in motion. [...] The next day, 25 March, Yahya met the senior army officers in Dhaka and gave the final go-ahead. At 6 pm, the divisional commanders received orders that the operation would commence an hour after midnight. Yahya would leave Dhaka in an hour, and the operation was timed to coincide with his arrival in Karachi. Through the day, the Awami League leadership had nervously awaited for the call from Peerzada. As night approached, they were increasingly convinced that the regime had decided to embark on the path of war. Despite the army’s best efforts at secrecy, Mujib learned of Yahya’s departure. The Awami League cadre swung into action, felling large trees, putting up barricades, and erecting roadblocks to prevent the army from getting out of the cantonment. The army command responded by advancing the H hour. At 11:30 pm on 25 March 1971, Operation Searchlight began.

From 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh by Srinath Raghavan, Harvard University Press, 2013

If you're interested in what the sources cited in the book are (for this): most of the public speeches etc. are cited directly to various Pakistani newspapers of the time (Dawn etc.) I suppose the more iffy parts are the quotes regarding what was said in negotiations. The book does give the impression of having used mostly author's interviews with the Bangladeshi side as far as direct participants go, e.g. with Kamal Hossain, but the book also cites Siddique Salik's books (Witness to Surrender, Onlooker’s Journal), the report of Hamoodur Rahman, Bhutto's own book, The Great Tragedy and the slightly more obscure book of Hasan Zaheer for some of the passages of what the West Pakistan actors said. So he does give the impression having made some effort to corroborate stuff from sources on both sides of the conflict/negotiation. Now I haven't read all of those myself, and they might disagree on some fine points or broader conclusions. What was said to the US side is the only stuff cited from US archives, as these are the only ones opened on those events (insofar), as far as I know. There's not much in the way of "neutral" secondary sources there, except the book of Sisson and Rose War and Secession cited here and there. Finally, the book (of Raghavan) has fairly positive reviews by some Westerner academics, e.g. you can read the 1st page of one of these (for free).

I'll post some quotes from Sisson and Rose in a separate answer, since I ran out space (it gets over 30000k! in this one.)

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