Was (Mahanian) "control of the seas" an Athenian goal in the age of the trireme?

Given the lack of a clearer definition by the author, I would imagine that your interpretation of "Control of the seas in the modern sense" being "Mahanian" is probably a good starting point.

From A.T. Mahan's perspective, sea power has two aspects; the protection of your interests at sea (and overseas) and your ability to interfere with your enemy's ability to do the same. It's important to bear in mind that the concept of "sea power" wasn't purely about military power. There was little to be gained from a having powerful navy if there wasn't a similarly powerful merchant fleet to reap the economic benefits (and help pay for the navy). By extension, if you can cut off your enemy's sea trade then you can put a strangle-hold on their economy and their ability to wage war.

Mahan's theory was based on his analysis of the rise of British naval power in the later 18th and early 19th centuries, and consquently has a global scope. The British had a widespread empire which required both a large navy to protect and an even larger merchant navy to exploit. The industrial revolution feed the British ability to create the materials, goods and vessels required and the logistics operation required to support them. In addition, the British ships were designed and built with this in mind and, compared to their European contemporaries, they could remain at sea much longer.

So can we apply this concept to Athens?

Certainly from a geographic view point, it would appear that there was a lot to be gained in the Greek world by controlling the seas. In the Peloponnesian War, Athens and her allies were spread around the coasts and islands of the Aegean Sea so trade, military support and communications between them were all dependent on sea travel. If you can control the seas, you prevent invasions of the islands you hold, force the enemy armies to travel overland (which in most cases would be slower), prevent the enemy from being resupplied/reinforced from the sea or even cut off trade to them all-together. At the same time, control of the seas will allow your own forces to move quickly and freely, likewise with trade, speedy diplomacy and military communications.

Naval blockades are important tools in the pursuit of sea power. They perform two functions; the first is to prevent significant enemy naval forces putting to sea and the second is to prevent commercial traffic from flowing in or out. The first protects your own naval and commercial vessels, while the latter directly interferes with the enemy's ability to finance, and therefore wage, war.

In the case of the British in the Napoleonic Wars, these two blockading functions were performed in different ways. The first, keeping the French fleet in port, was done by stationing fleets that (extreme weather permitting) directly blockaded the main French naval bases (Breast, Toulon, etc.) for months at a time. The secondary function, of choking off trade, had to be performed in a much looser fashion. There were simply too many commercial ports and harbours to assign standing fleets and squadrons too. Therefore, British naval cruisers (in the original sense of the word) and privateers would rove along the sea lanes looking for likely targets (both commercial and military).

The Greek trireme wasn't particulary suited to either of these blockading styles.

The trireme was accordingly light and comparatively frail, and was not equipped to endure rough weather for long, thus restricting its ability to remain at sea for any period of time...Normally a trireme would put into shore at the first sight of a storm, for the crew's midday meal and then again for the night...Obviously, if a trireme had to put to shore twice a day, no navy was capable of blockading a single coastal state, let alone an island.

^{Ancient Greek Warship, 500-322 BC, Nic Fields, (Osprey, 2007)}

Similarly, its ability to function as a cruiser was limited, since any engagement, which would involve ramming the target vessel, could very likely require repairs to the trireme itself. In contrast, cruisers (on both sides) during the Napoleonic wars were able to capture multiple enemy vessels on a single multi-month voyage without having to put into port.

In addition, the ability to sustain a blockade (and therefore make it effective) is heavily dependent on the blockading forces capability to resupply and maintain their forces at sea. In the case of the Napoleonic wars, the British navy was supported by a massive (industrial) maintenance and logistics operation that, much of the time, was hard-pressed to keep sufficient ships on station and on patrol. I can find little evidence that even Athens had anything like it in the ancient Greek world.

So in conclusion, I would say that "control of the seas" would have been a worthy goal during the Peloponnesian War but there wasn't the structure or tools available at the time to support it.