How do Christians who believe in libertarian free will respond to R.C. Sproul's critique in the article "What Is Free Will?"?

I interact here from a compatibilist perspective: https://philosophical-theology.com/2022/03/26/moving-beyond-sproulian-compatibilism/

I haven't read all that stuff, but I have encountered many persuasive arguments against free will, and the most persuasive are all the same, whether it is an atheist materialist or Calvinist making the argument.

The argument is the following.

Premise: the will is either determined, undetermined, or some combination thereof.

1. If the will is determined, it is not free.
2. If it is undetermined, then it is random, then it is not a will.
3. Combining determinism and undeterminism merely combines problems #1 and #2.

Conclusion: since all pieces of the disjunction do not give us free will, and the disjunction is exhaustive, therefore free will is not a logically coherent concept.

I find this argument very persuasive, and was persuaded for many years. Then, I discovered the argument is logically flawed.

The flaw in this argument is #2. While all random things are undetermined, this does not entail that all undetermined things are random. Assuming all undetermined things are random is basically smuggling the conclusion into the premise. It is logically possible for there to be undetermined things that are also not random, i.e. precisely the concept of libertarian free will.

Therefore, the basic argument against free will is logically flawed, and libertarian free will is a logical possibility.

What would be an example of libertarian free will? I submit God as a example of a being that must necessarily have libertarian free will. God's will, by logical necessity, is not determined by anything outside of Himself. If His will were determined, then that thing would be more powerful than God, which is a contradiction. Libertarian free will is a will that is not determined by anything outside of itself. Therefore, God must have libertarian free will.

Conversely, if libertarian free will is not a logically coherent concept, then God is not a logically coherent concept.

Sproul's argument is what I will loosely refer to as a "false trichotomy". When presented formally, it looks like this:

• Let A = No free will
• Let B = What Sproul calls "humanist free will"
• Let C = Sproul's view on free will, based on his theology of the Fall

P1: A v B v C

P2: ~A

P3: ~B

C: therefore C

I reject the conclusion because I reject Premise 1--Sproul has presented 3 possibilities as if there are only 3 possibilities. On this matter I disagree. I will review A, B, & C, and offer another option.

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Option A - No Free Will

Sproul expends little effort on responding to this view, probably because he knows his audience does not believe it. I will respond to the most popular "scientific" argument against free will.

Informal presentation: atoms do not have free will, and people are made of atoms, therefore people have no free will.

When presented informally, this argument looks compelling. The trouble is, it is not a valid argument; to show the conclusion deductively one more premise is needed. The trouble is, when the 3rd premise is added and the argument is presented formally, it falls apart faster than political promises the day after election day.

Formal presentation:

P1: Atoms have no free will

P2: Humans are made of atoms

P3: Things made of atoms do not possess characteristics that atoms do not possess

C: Therefore, humans have no free will.

(parallel arguments can be made replacing "atoms" with other materials)

This argument is self-refuting. I take no issue with premises 1 & 2, but if premises 1 & 2 are true, premise 3 is demonstrably false. We can show this by plugging other statements into premise 1--this deductive argument is a simple engine for negating human possession whatever is given as the direct object in premise 1.

Atoms also have no consciousness and no memory. If we plug either of them into premise 1, the very same argument used above will conclude that humans have no consciousness and humans have no memory.

Aside from the obvious difficulty that we think we do have these things, there is a far more fundamental problem here. We may think we remember learning that in 1905 Einstein used Brownian motion to demonstrate that atoms exist...but if memory is an illusion, we don't really remember that. And in fact, even if Einstein had worked out such an argument, he wouldn't have remembered it in order to record it for future readers. If we toss memory out the door, we toss out everything we think we know about science along with it, including premises 1 & 2 of the original argument.

The conclusion of the argument negates two of its own premises--this means the argument is not sound. Therefore, at least one of the premises is false. As noted above, I suggest premises 1 & 2 are pretty secure statements. I reject premise 3 as self-refuting.

Fundamental to the discipline of philosophy is the view that we are rational in believing our perceptions in the absence of a defeater. We perceive that we have free will, and there is no good defeater (one was discussed above, happy to discuss other failed candidates elsewhere). Thus, we are rational in believing we have free will. This stands in opposition to Option A.

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Option B - "Humanist" Free Will

I am quite comfortable with the belief that outside forces can influence our decisions without determining our decisions. This happens all the time when people agonize over conflicting advice and ultimately reject some of it. This stands in opposition to Option B.

Although I think this definition of free will could be further sub-divided into additional, non-identical theories of free will, I do not see any compelling reason to accept or defend "humanist free will". While I think Sproul has over-simplified the topic, for sake of argument I'll grant ~B.

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Option C - Sproulian Free Will

Sproul's view of free will derives from his theology of the Fall generally, and the belief in Total Depravity specifically. Since I do not accept the doctrine of total depravity, I do not accept Sproul's conclusions that follow from it either.

Total depravity is based upon a theology of original sin; while there are varying degrees/interpretations of what is meant by "total depravity", a few relevant statements on the theology are listed below:

We are enslaved to the evil impulses and desires of our hearts. The body, the mind, the will, the spirit—indeed, the whole person—have been infected by the power of sin. (source)

a state of corruption due to original sin held in Calvinism to infect every part of man's nature and to make the natural man unable to know or obey God (source)

every person born into the world is morally corrupt, enslaved to sin and is, apart from the grace of God, utterly unable to choose to follow God (source)

In his total rebellion everything man does is sin (source)

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A 4th Option

More than 4 options could be listed, but to defeat a "false trichotomy" only 4 options are needed.

I do not believe in total depravity; I believe the following:

16 And even if it were possible that little children could sin they could not be saved; but I say unto you they are blessed; for behold, as in Adam, or by nature, they fall, even so the blood of Christ atoneth for their sins.

17 And moreover, I say unto you, that there shall be no other name given nor any other way nor means whereby salvation can come unto the children of men, only in and through the name of Christ, the Lord Omnipotent.

18 For behold he judgeth, and his judgment is just; and the infant perisheth not that dieth in his infancy; but men drink damnation to their own souls except they humble themselves and become as little children, and believe that salvation was, and is, and is to come, in and through the atoning blood of Christ, the Lord Omnipotent.

19 For the natural man is an enemy to God, and has been from the fall of Adam, and will be, forever and ever, unless he yields to the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and putteth off the natural man and becometh a saint through the atonement of Christ the Lord, and becometh as a child, submissive, meek, humble, patient, full of love, willing to submit to all things which the Lord seeth fit to inflict upon him, even as a child doth submit to his father. (Mosiah 3:16-19)

In response to the 4 quotes on total depravity listed above:

• I believe we are (at least) dual beings. Our body has natural tendencies in opposition to God; our spirit has spent eons learning to obey God, and there is tension between them. The world entices through bodily desires; God inspires through communication to the spirit; we must choose which voice to yield to.
• I do not believe in the common understanding of "original sin". I believe that "men will be punished for their own sins, and not for Adam's transgression" (see Articles of Faith 1:2)
• I believe children are born into this world pure and clean.
• I believe people can choose of their own free will to do good (see Doctrine & Covenants 58:26-29), and that grace is not a handout, but a covenant, which we must choose to accept and in which we play an active part.

This stands in opposition to Option C.

The Book of Mormon has an entire chapter devoted to the Fall and human agency. I'll cite two segments from it:

14 And now, my sons, I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning; for there is a God, and he hath created all things, both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them are, both things to act and things to be acted upon.

...

16 Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other. (2 Nephi 2:14,16)

Humans are creations to act, not creations to be acted upon. Part of exercising that ability to act is to be enticed by competing options. We cannot truly claim to have moral agency if we walk a path upon which there is never a fork in the road. The presence of competing options, far from demonstrating determinism or "humanist" free will, makes possible the morally consequential exercise of libertarian free will. We have competing options and are able to act upon them.

26 And the Messiah cometh in the fulness of time, that he may redeem the children of men from the fall. And because that they are redeemed from the fall they have become free forever, knowing good from evil; to act for themselves and not to be acted upon, save it be by the punishment of the law at the great and last day, according to the commandments which God hath given.

27 Wherefore, men are free according to the flesh; and all things are given them which are expedient unto man. And they are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men, or to choose captivity and death, according to the captivity and power of the devil; for he seeketh that all men might be miserable like unto himself. (2 Nephi 2:26-27)

Jesus Christ overcomes all of the effects of the Fall; though full redemption from the Fall is not promised until the time of the resurrection, at which point we overcome physical death (body & spirit reunite), and overcome spiritual death (brought back to the presence of God to be judged). For a more extensive treatment of this theology, see my video here.

God has given us a plan that is all about what we become. We can choose to accept or reject the transformative power & covenants He offers us. We may be "enticed" and encouraged and exhorted, but we will not be forced. We have been given the moral capacity to use the atonement of Jesus Christ to become something better than we are right now. Becoming is a process, not an event, and I believe full transformation into everything we can become (see 1 John 3:2-3) is a process that will carry on well beyond mortal life, but it is marked by major milestones, such as the one described by King Benjamin's people in Mosiah chapter 5:

2 And they all cried with one voice, saying: Yea, we believe all the words which thou hast spoken unto us; and also, we know of their surety and truth, because of the Spirit of the Lord Omnipotent, which has wrought a mighty change in us, or in our hearts, that we have no more disposition to do evil, but to do good continually. (Mosiah 5:2)

These people did not suddenly cease falling short, but there was a fundamental change in their desires. They were more godly people after that experience than they were before; they were moving in the right direction. And when eternity is your x-axis, moving in the right direction is what counts: the slope of the line matters far, far more than where you are today.

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Conclusion

I believe in a Savior whose atoning sacrifice has the power to make me better not only at some distant time in the future, but can start the process right now. Every step of creation, commandment, destruction, or renewal recorded in scripture proceeds line upon line (see Isaiah 28:10), accumulating the results of what came before. I believe the same is true with God's transformation of a human being. God can and does change us, a little at a time, if we choose to yield to His voice over competing options.

I believe Sproul incorrectly conflates our "free will" with our "desires". We may desire many things, some of which conflict with each other. We may desire strongly something in the short-term and something else in the long-term (indeed many of our choices pit short-term gain vs. long-term loss & vice-versa). Free will gives us the capacity to act, to choose which voice we will yield to. So while I don't necessarily contend with Sproul's view that humans pick the desire that is the most compelling in the moment, I suggest the analogy would be better cast in different words:

We choose which voices to listen to; we choose which influences to entertain. Many voices compete for our attention; we control which speakers get turned up and which speakers get turned down. While we may well follow the voice that speaks the loudest, we set the volume.

Post-script

Several thoughtful, competing views have suggested that a Christian belief in libertarian free will necessarily collapses into Pelagianism. I respectfully suggest this is a false dichotomy.

Pelagius held that humans could attain perfection on their own, suggested the expectation that humans live sinless lives, and that babies are born innocent. Accepting the 3rd of those propositions (which I do) does not require accepting the first two. Although children regularly experience consequences (good & bad) from their parents' choices, I do not accept the doctrine that infants are born into this world bearing guilt for the actions of progenitors.

That there are some things we are unable to do does not mean there are no things we are able to do--this is unnecessarily reductive. If we accept for sake of argument that I have free will, it neither relieves me of the consequences of my choices nor permits me to do literally anything. I can choose from among a finite set of options where I wish to live, but I cannot choose to live on the surface of Proxima Centauri.

If 2 men with free will are standing on a cliff and one chooses to jump off, they both still have free will, but one now has a much smaller set of options to choose from than the other. Our options today can certainly be increased or reduced by our (or somebody else's) actions yesterday. From scriptural texts I agree that there are clearly some things we cannot do unaided, but the aid is being offered and we can choose whether to accept it.

As someone who holds to libertarian free will, I can immediately spot that what Sproul describes in "Spontaneous Choice" is not, in fact, libertarian free will, but goes beyond the accepted definition. Libertarian free will only states that our choices are not determined by anything external, or our own predispositions. They are certainly conditioned, or influenced. If I really like ice cream, hate avocado, and am presented with a choice between the two, my immediate pick of the ice cream is by no means random or spontaneous. Some people hold to a false dichotomy between determinism and total randomness, without allowing for non-deterministic influences.

His incorrect starting premise flows on into his other arguments, with the emphasis being placed on spontaneity which advocates of LFW do not hold to. I would agree that such a view of free will would be problematic and wouldn't make sense when contrasted with what we see in the world around us.

TL;DR - Christians who believe in libertarian free will would not need to offer much response to Sproul's critique, as his critique is based on an alternate (and rarely held) view of free will and focuses on an aspect that LFW does not share.

The first view is what I’m going to call the “humanist” view of free will, which I would say is the most widely prevalent view of human freedom that we find in our culture. I’m sad to say that, in my opinion, it’s the most widely held view within the church as well as outside the church.

In this scheme, free will is defined as our ability to make choices spontaneously. That is, the choices we make are in no wise conditioned or determined by any prior prejudice, inclination, or disposition. Let me say that again: this view says that we make our choices spontaneously. Nothing previous to the choice determines the choice—no prejudice, prior disposition, or prior inclination—the choice comes literally on its own as a spontaneous action by the person.

Does anyone actually believe this definition of free will? Like literally anybody at all? He asserts, with no evidence provided, that this absurd strawman is "the most widely prevalent view" but I'm not aware of anyone who holds to it.

Sproul seems to be claiming that if choices are not deterministic then they must be purely random, effects without causes, which reads as a ridiculous strawman based on the fallacy of the excluded middle. I don't think anyone denies that past experiences create "prejudice, disposition or inclination" that influences choices. (If they didn't, everything we know about human psychology would be worthless.)

The idea of free will is not that past experiences do not play a part in determining choices, but rather that their influence is not absolute, that a person can choose to be something other than what an outside observer looking at the variables would predict.

The response from those who believe in free will to a question like this is to observe that a false premise invalidates everything built upon it, and dismiss the argument in its entirety.