Is the following quote in conventional lanaguge?

No where in that quote show nihilist wanderers not see 5 khandha as self.

That context mean " nihilist wanderers think about 5 khandha (with avijjā and taṇhā that nihilist wanderers never known) as self. And they think that when self die, self will never born again".

But the truth is "where is taṇhā, there is born (paṭiccasamuppāda)". However they can't think like that because they never enlighten paṭiccasamuppāda.

Every question of yours look like my view at 12 years ago, when I was an innocent buddhist and before I have learn pali and try to recite tipitaka-pali.

So I never support study system of western's buddhism, because I never want to take anyone jump to conclusions as alike as I never want to take anyone just believe in tipitaka.

In the translation of DN 1 that I'm reading, after the description of the 7 types of annihilation-belief, the Tathagata says (I paraphrase),

The Tathagata understands these views, and knows the result of these views (i.e. the next existence in which those who hold these views will be reborn). He knows the dhamma that's better than these views, doesn't have false view, therefore rids himself of the three poisons, because he understands cessation of sensation and liberation from attachment to sensation (i.e. realizes nibanna).

You asked, "If those nihilist wanderers did not believe in 'self' ( and thus used 'conventional language'), why were they not considered to be enlightened?"

It seems to me that no matter how they talk about "self", and no matter what kind of "self" or body is annihilated at death, the Buddha's definition of "right view" is something else: e.g. it includes knowledge of cessation of sensation (from the jhanas, I suppose) and liberation from attachment to sensation.

It appears to me those Brahmins believed in none existence. It appears they did not believe in kamma and rebirth. What Buddha taught was the dependent origination. It is not enough to understand the not self. That has to be realised through dependent origination.

This hypothetical person regards the 'self' as the individuality physically distinguishable -- the physical body composed of the elements, born from mother/father.

Then, arguably such 'self' as used by this person might be the same 'self' as used in conventional language by the Buddha and the Arahats. The word, then, could have the same function for both groups, in this context.

While such person likely denies the existence of an enduring self -- which would be in agreement with the Buddha -- the quote suggests the view that death marks the end of experiencing, that death is the end of experience. And this, according to the Buddha, is wrong view.

The best argument I know of in the suttas for this stance is that, if such was the case, then karma (and, consequently, morality) would be fiction: there would be no results of actions according to their moral nature (and consequently, morality would be an unnecessary obstacle to gains and benefits, to happiness). Or, more precisely, such results could only occur during this very life -- so one better do all evil things as fast and careful as possible and enjoy the benefits of it while avoiding any bad external outcomes (outcomes that are not really governed by karma law, but exclusively by social conventions of a given time and given culture, e.g. criminal laws and law enforcement).

Another argument against this view can be inferred from the suttas around Nirvana. That is, under this view, Nirvana would have a doubtful value. Why would anyone spend a lifetime avoiding worldly pleasures, enduring hardship, for the promise of an hypothetical "best pleasure" that would only last for a few years? That is, until the person dies. And yet, such person would still suffer physical pain, just like anyone else. Under this view then, once he/she dies, it doesn't matter who attained Nirvana and who didn't, since the same thing happens to everyone equally: the end happens.