Did the Gallic army besieged in Alesia conduct itself well when expecting relief?

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Some comments from others (in addition to the answer) shed light on why Vercingetorix failed. One was that Caesar was a "genius." It is is precisely for this reason that Vercingetorix should have used attrition tactics. Caesar will outmaneuver your army in open field. Your best chance of winning is to use your superior numbers to engage in "knife fights."

The same person pointed out that it was not a "rebellion." True enough, from the Gallic point of view. But the Romans regarded Gaul as their province, and treated Vercingetorix like a "rebel." ("Gallia est in tre partes divida.")

Ulysses S. Grant waged a successful war of attrition because he knew 1) he was fighting the "great" Robert E. Lee, and 2) he was fighting "slavery." Does Grant's use of attrition tactic support his reputation as a general?

(The Gauls had no idea that they would be slaves of the Romans for 500 years; they treated it as another "tribal" war.) Hence, they appeared to lack the "do or die" mentality need to fight a war of attrition.

Then, we have the modern example of Stalingrad. At that battle, the Russians deliberately moved their trenches as close as possible to the Germans' to nullify the latter's initial superiority in "heavy weapons," tanks and planes. They would stage nightly grenade attacks to exhaust the Germans, and send "raiders" behind the German lines to steal food and water or at least "spoil" it for the Germans. German commanders initially criticized the Russians for "wasting lives" (more Russians than Germans were "caught" in these fights), but later admitted that these attacks exhausted and demoralized their remaining troops. Of course, the Russians knew that "slavery" (or worse) was in store for them if they didn't win.

One clear thing that Vercingtorix probably should have done was to "countermine," that is, dig one or more trenches from the city to the Roman lines. He probably feared Roman retaliation, but should have welcomed it, because his men could have fought the enemy on far more even terms in the trenches than in the open field at any given time. This would also have had two important effects on the "last day" of the battle:

1) The besieged soldiers could start their "breakout" from positions already in place, rather than having to approach the Roman lines without the protection of trenches.

2) They would have signalled the relieving force the best place to break in. As it were, the relieving force approached from the northwest, their "natural" direction, which also featured the best defensive terrain (for the Romans). Which is a major reason the Gauls lost.

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It seems to me that most of the things you suggest Vercingetorix might have done is what he actually did. They did try to stop the circumvallation, but failed to make a noticeable impact. Once help arrived they tried to attack from both sides at once, also at night, which was close to succeeding.

Of course, everything we know about this siege comes from Julias Caesar himself, and as this almost successful attack was finally countered to a large part through Caesar's personal bravery, he might have takes some license with actual facts.... :-)

You can't exactly say that Vercingetorix tried a all out war of attrition, but it seems like a besieged city that are low on resources are doomed to lose any war attrition per definition.

See the Wikipedia article about the Battle of Alesia and "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries by Julius Caesar.

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