Were Allied high commanders that bad at the end of WW2?

As with any historical judgment, consider the context of the event.

By 1945, the war was obviously drawing to a conclusion. A lot of commanders saw little point in getting more soldiers killed for a foregone conclusion.

So if the commanders were cautious and slow late in the war, a desire not to lose soldiers for no appreciable alteration of the outcome was probably high on their list of priorities.

Your view of events changes when you get out of a comfortable chair and into a foxhole with bullets coming at you.

Contrast this with Stalin sacrificing over 100,000 Russian lives for the prestige of 'taking Berlin'.

Surround it, pound it, and wait would have worked just fine. If they had dragged that out to July, Berlin could have been the first city to be attacked with a nuclear bomb.

From a U.S. perspective alone, I would conclude that the observation is self-evidently true - just noting how many of its WW2 generals came from the class the stars fell on (Westpoint 1915). Of the 164 graduates that year 59 attained the rank of Brigadier General or higher. From the exigencies of rapid buildup starting in 1940 falling hard on the previous 20 years of disarmament, of course mediocrity was the rule. Yet still, they were "good enough".

Making war is the ultimate example of making do with what one has. However mightily one might wish for different circumstances and material, one must find a way with what one has at hand. Yes, a better trained and more experienced senior command would have been nice - but that wasn't the hand dealt in 1940.

There's plenty of good answers on there already, so I won't be going into detail on what's already stated in answers.

However one of the big reason was the British manpower crisis. In 1939, United Kingdom itself (excluding its colonies, whose manpower could not be easily accessed by London) only had a population in the ballpark of 47 million. To put this into perspective Germany had a population of nearly twice of that. Soviets&Americans had well beyond 100 million+. However, unlike the Americans who had ample manpower to field a 2 ocean navy and a huge army, or the Soviets who only had to focus on a single front against the Nazis, Britain had to protect its empire all over the globe from all 3 axis powers.

Its army fought in Dunkirk&battle of France, the north African campaign against Italy&Germany, Ethiopian campaign against the Italians in Ethiopia, pacific campaign, the Burma campaign, the battle of Greece, invasion of Sicily, liberation of Southern Greece, Dday, Operation Dragoon, liberation of low countries, invasion of Germany, etc.

Its navy fought in just as many battles as its army --- Dunkirk, protecting convoys in the Atlantic, fighting the Japanese in the Indian Ocean and Pacific, fighting the Regina Marina and Kriegsmarine in the mediterranean, assisting Dday, etc.

In the end, the British were running so low on manpower that they were disbanding divisions into Cadres. This led to Bernard Montgomery taking an overly conservative approach in many battles, hence leading to perceived poor performance amongst the allies. However, he did manage to succeed in keeping the casualties low for the allies. Compared to the Germans, Japanese, the Soviets, or the Chinese, the western allies (UK&its dominions and the US) suffered relatively few casualties in WW2.

TLDR: British manpower crisis, which led to Bernard Montgomery commanding too conservatively, leading to perceived poor performance due to them not making as aggressive gains as the soviets and others.

Loser/winner bias?

Could there be some sprinkling of bias hidden in the premise of the OP? Given enough research, one is bound to bind major blunders or bad commanders on all sides.

With surviving German commanders, there's the "madman Hitler" card, which is used a lot by the generals writing their memoirs post WW2. So, some of the blunders of the German side may be masked in the popular perception by a layer of "this was Hitlers bad decision".

With allied commanders, especially late in the war, there is the issue of "the war is practically won, and all losses feel especially galling". So, I guess the scrutiny of blunders in the Western Europe '44 theater on the Allied side is higher than the scrutiny of German blunders during the invasion of France.

There might also be an element of Allied propaganda involved in the perception of the generals. If get regular beatings from Rommel in North Africa pre El Alamein; what's more convenient for Allied media: paining your own generals in a bad light, or insinuating that Rommel is some tactical genius?

Recent authors of books about WWII that cover mostly allied point of view, like Anthony Beevor or Rick Atkinson, are quite critic of Allied commanders (like Patton, Montgomery or Clark), specially because they were interested on looking good, get fame or solve personal issues. For example:

1. Mark Clark forced his army to reach Rome before D-Day, because he knew that after D-Day he will lost all media attention.
2. Patton sent a force far beyond his lines to reach a prisoner of war camp, where his son-in-law was kept. The operation was a failure.
3. Montgomery several times disdained american generals and claimed for himself the command of all western Europe forces.

Also, these authors complain that allied generals were not that good as the media during the war said. For example, Montgomery was criticised for being slow or using a lot of resources in operations (Operation Plunder), he never took risks, and when he did, he failed (Marked-Garden). Patton took too many risks, sacrificing forces, like in Metz. Hodges had a strees crisis during the battle of bulge.

About your research, I'll give you a little bit more information.
The Falaise pocket wasn't a full encirclement, germans where able to leave the trap, and most german looses were due to air force attacks. Actually, allies were too slow to close the trap.
While the topic of logistics, that is something that a commander has to take in account, they are guilty for disdain that. Actually, the crisis that allied had with logistics after september 1944, was because Montgomery did not open the harbor of Antwerp and its access (I mean, western Scheldt, including the island, like Walcheren).

Now, in my opinion, these authors realized that these generals were quite normal people compared to other generals. But one has to remember that during the war, they were idols.

Their books are quite good, do not miss them.

Circumstances more then lack of talent

• Allied troops and commanders were mostly "green". The vast majority of commanders in France of 1944 never had opportunity to lead large formations (armies, corps, divisions) in the field. Some had experience from Northern Africa and Italy (Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery ...) but even that was on a different terrain, against a less strategically important and much weaker opponent. Lower level officers and troops usually never saw combat before France'44. As such they often had to suffer casualties because of rookie mistakes, and to pay with their own blood the price of inexperience. Germans on the other hand also had a lot of raw recruits among them, but officers and NCOs were usually veterans of the Eastern Front.

• Germans had superiority in certain weapon types . This is especially true in armored warfare. Not to go into details, but various German tanks and anti-tank guns of 7.5 cm and 8.8 cm caliber would relatively easily penetrate the armor of the M4 Sherman, the most ubiquitous tank in the Allied arsenal. The reverse was often not the case, anyway since Allies were on the attack, most often then not their tanks would be under fire of aforementioned anti-tank guns and newly developed Panzerfaust. And with tanks knocked out or forced to retreat, the Allied infantry had a tough job penetrating German lines.

• Allies depended too much on air power . Allies had aerial superiority and used it as much as they could to break German lines of defense, eventual attack formations, and interdict supplies and reinforcements coming to the front line. This worked well in the Summer of 1944, with good weather and especially in the open terrain (not so well in blockage) . However, in the Autumn of 1944 and Winter of 1944/45, weather, as expected, it grow worse for aerial support. Forested and rugged terrain like for example in Hürtgen Forest also did not help spotting targets from the air. It is also worth mentioning that the Siegfried line, although partially obsolete in 1944, did somewhat shield German forces from aerial spotting and attacks, thus further reducing the Allied offensive capability.

• Allied logistical difficulties Often overlooked, but it should be mentioned that while Allies did have plenty of supplies in US and Britain, bringing them to France was not trivial, mostly because of lack of ports. Allies had to use one of the Mullberry harbors well into 1945, or land cargo directly at the beaches. Germans either thoroughly wrecked French port facilities or held them until the end of the war. As a consequence, certain supply crisis developed in the Autumn of 1944, and advance was slowed down allowing Germans to regroup around the aforementioned Siegfried line, thus prolonging the war.

The American and British army commanders made some mistakes that are clear in retrospect (and Mark Clark's error, with respect to winning the war, in going for Rome rather than cutting off and destroying the Germans retreating from Monte Cassino was obvious at the time). They tend to look less competent than the German generals, and there are historical reasons for that.

Being an army officer was definitely more prestigious in pre- and post-WWI Germany than it was in the US or the UK at the time. The German Empire also practiced conscription before WWI which meant that anyone who had military talent would get a chance to develop it. In the US and the UK at the time, you had to volunteer to join the army, and men unaware they had a talent for it rarely did.

During WWI, almost all British and many American men served, but most of them regarded it as an obligation of wartime, and wanted to return to their normal lives. When the very limited German army allowed by the Treaty of Versailles was created, it was only allowed 100,000 men, of whom only 4,000 could be officers, and it was very selective about who it retained, having a pretty clear idea of how it had lost the war. Staying in the German army after WWI was attractive, both because it was prestigious, and because it was reliable employment in a very unstable Germany.

This meant that the inter-war German army had carefully selected officers and NCOs. It also took good care to train them, not just for the job they had, but for higher ranks, since the army leadership always looked forward to a day when it could expand, and wanted a strong cadre to allow quick and effective expansion. The British and US armies didn't have nearly such a clear vision of what they might need to do.

The captains and majors of the inter-war German Army became the colonels and generals of the Heer. They were better-trained and more experienced than the Allied officers at the start of the war, and they gained experience faster, because Germany was fighting all the time. But the careful selection at the end of WWI was the biggest difference.

Sources: several, but Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power has the advantage of having been written by someone who knew many of the participants.

If the Germans had better generals, how did the Allies win WWII? Economic and population advantages, better management of R&D producing new weapons to counter German ones, and political leadership that did not attempt to micro-manage operations, but did pay attention to logistical and technological issues. Hitler interfered with both production and operations continually during 1944-45. Goering, who was the official No.2, and the commander of the Luftwaffe, was lazy and did not understand most technological advances.