Why did the Buddha not answer Vacchagotta (SN 44.10), but did answer the monks (MN 140)?

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The questions are similar in that the existence of self appears to be discussed.

In Vacchagotta's question, a nonsensical demand about the question of existence of self is simply ignored as nonsense.

However, in the case of the monks, they are simply using the convention "he" as a proxy for "that aggregate known as Pukkusāti". And the question is about kamma, not self. The monks are not asserting Pukkusāti's literal existence any more than saying "what will happen to this piece of toast tomorrow?" Indeed, if the monks had asked "where has Vacchagotta been reborn in the next life?", the answer might not be so bright. Vacchagotta's rebirth might be a bit like the plastics in the ocean. Not extinguished, entangled in notions of a self.

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In MN 140, the monks asked the question: "Tassa kā gati, ko abhisamparāyo". There is an exact sutta in the Majjhima Nikaya, namely, MN 68, which ends with the Buddha explaining why he answers this very question. MN 68 says, per Horner translation:

The Tathāgata, Anuruddha, does not have the purpose of defrauding people nor the purpose of cajoling people nor the purpose of gains, honour, fame and material advantages, nor the thought: ‘Let people know me thus’ when he explains the uprising (upapattīsu; noun; locative case) in which are disciples who have deceased and passed away, saying: ‘Such and such a one has uprisen (uapanno; verb; past participle) in one, such a one has uprisen (upapanno) in another.’ But there are, Anuruddha, young men of family who have faith and are of great enthusiasm, of great joyousness, and who, having heard this, focus their minds on suchness. Anuruddha, this will be for their weal and happiness for a long time.

In summary, the question by the monks is answered for the sake of explaining the Path progress of the deceased for the purpose of generating faith in the community. The question is not answered for the purpose of generating belief in reincarnation or self.

Where as Vacchagotta was a befuddled wanderer and his question was not related to any aspect of the Path.

END of ANSWER



Note: Ven. Sujato translates MN 68 as:

"What advantage does the Realized One see in declaring the rebirth of his disciples who have passed away:

kaṁ atthavasaṁ sampassamāno tathāgato sāvake abbhatīte kālaṅkate upapattīsu byākaroti:

Bhikkhu Bodhi translates "upapattīsu" here as "reappearance".

The above appears more evidence supporting the assertion of Ven. Yuttadhammo on BSE and also DD there is no Pali word that means "rebirth" because when the Buddha declares a deceased disciple is an Arahant obviously this is not a declaration of a "rebirth" or "reappearance" because Arahants are not subject to any "rebirth" or "reappearance".

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I don't see the similarity

Vaccagotta asks whether there is a self or not and i assert that meaning is close to whether there is a soul-consciousness.

Bhikkhus ask where was Pukkusati reborn.

A person can be said to be reborn without there being an assertion of the persistence of consciousness.

Like knowledge is transferred from a teacher to student or how a family lineage is perpetually upheld without there being same anything transmigating from one to another but yet we say it is the same knowledge being transferred or same lineage being upheld.

So monks too can say that a being is reborn without making the redundant assertions because when one speaks of a being one speaks in terms of the doctrine of self, whether this doctrine is agreed upon as being a grasping with wrong view is what separates ariya from common people.

Imo it is most evident in questions Buddha would ask to have one pin down the existence of self.

  • Are the body/intellect/feelings/perceptions a self? No
  • Is the self without body/intellect/feelings/perceptions? No
  • Is the self in, apart from or is the body/intellect/feelings/perception taken together? No

So, one asserts the terms of the doctrine but it does not align with inferable elements and is therefore a lie basically or a grasping with wrong view of some sort.

When it comes to inferable elements this is the very basis for the doctrine of dependent origination.

In it's most basic form there is a discussion or pondering about "something" because there is a pondering and it has an object and the object's particulars which can be agreed upon due to inference and demonstration.

It can agreed upon that there is seeing, smelling, hearing, feeling, tasting & thinking and it can be agreed upon that these depend on certain requisite conditions.

Seeing depends on the eye, when there is no eye there is no seeing. Seeing depends on the visible form, when there is no lights forms do not become visible. Seeing depends on the eye-consciousness, an unconscious person doesn't see even if there is an eye & light by which forms are made visible.

We know even from QM physics or philosophical paradoxes that the eye in no way persists over time so why would one assume this about consciousness.

Yet one can speak about an eye persisting or a person getting a new eye without any issues and likewise it is in the texts.

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