score:35
The ongoing arms race in armored warfare between defensive measures and offensive weapons generally means that a given tank is able to resist the weapons of the previous generation and, in turn, be able to defeat the armor of the previous generation.
In the 1991 Gulf War, while the coalition forces had the Abrams and Challenger MBTs (which were best-of-breed at the time), the Iraqi army was largely equiped with previous generation Chinese type-69 and Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks. These export-market tanks also lacked the more sophisticated night-fighting and range-finding equipment found on the Soviet Army machines. The small numbers of newer T-72 tanks, which were in the possession of the Republican Guard, were also export models that lacked the explosive reactive armor of the Soviet models. Had they possessed this, they might have fared better.
As a consequence, the Iraqis had to get lucky to get a kill, whereas the coalition tanks could destroy an opponent with almost any clean hit. Add to that the ability of the better trained coalitions crews to fire faster (and on the move) and the low morale of the Iraqi crews (who often abandoned their vehicles prior to being engaged) and the results don't seem so strange.
Upvote:-4
I would imagine the coalition's TOTAL air superiority might have come in to play here. Undefended tanks on the ground would be easy pickings for a squadron of A-10 Warthogs (aka "Tank Busters")
Upvote:11
Although it isn't a complete answer to your question, you can gain some insight into the lopsidedness of this and other similar confrontations by reading this analysis:
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars
The gist of the article is that there is a rather large disconnect in Arabic armies' culture. Officers and enlisted men are seen in a different caste-like system without much mutual respect.
Which trickles down to training. Information tends to be hoarded rather than spread around freely. The article references an American liaison who handed out training manuals to enlisted men, then the officers followed and collected them. The reason being - if you are the only one who knows how to work a given machine or fix a particular widget, it increases your worth. American tank crews are the exact opposite, each trained to understand and take the initiative and take over any other given station if that station should become unmanned.
This adds up to problems with distrust, decision making, and inability to take the initiative. There is definitely a difference between technology, but if you add to that the fact that Arabic armies suffer from these paralyzing deficits it's no small wonder why the Iraqi tanks just basically sat there and took it.
Upvote:23
According to AAR reports, the losses the Coalition took in this battle were almost all friendly fire incidents.
Same AARs indicate that Coalition forces had decisive advantage in:
SO to answer your questions: Iraqis did fought well and could engage Americans, but being completely outclassed in equipment department their numerical advantage was virtually immaterial. So what if they could hit american tanks if the shots simply bounced?