score:11
Its soldiers saw wide ranging combat experience over the 3 years in conflict against veteran soldiers of Germany and Japan.
I believe you have answered your own question: The USA was war weary and looked forward with optimism to a time of peace. "The Red Scare" was simply that - a scare - nothing more. The country was trying put itself back together: There was very little interest or motivation on the part of those combat scarred veterans or their families to shove off to the distant shores of China and Korea and fight a nebulous red chimera in another brutal war. In short "motivation" was the indeed the determining factor.
It was not a question of not being able to win, but of not wanting to devote the requisite blood and treasure victory would have required. Unlike some other nations, ruled by despots and military leaders, in the USA the domestic political climate directly impacts foreign policy particularly with respect to wars: The President and Congress are in charge of waging war, and they are civilians, who owe their power directly to the civilian electorate. If the electorate objects to a war, the elected officials will very soon take notice. This pattern has been repeated many times in the course of American History, back to the USA's earliest days.
Initially, the USA was very wary of becoming engaged in a ground conflict in Korea: At the same time, the Administration was worried that a war in Korea could quickly widen into another world war should the Chinese or Soviets decide to get involved as well... The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisors believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.
But the Korean conflict was becoming increasingly protracted, complex and deadly - the first of the modern American "quagmires": There were serious setbacks in the fighting around the 38th parallel in early 1951, and the USSR had started getting involved in the Spring of 1951. At that point, Truman himself, who had gone into Korea (under the cover of a UN 'police action') hoping the the US could limit its involvement principally to air strikes and some naval action, became pessimistic about the situation in Korea, as the prospect of a large scale ground war loomed imminent - something he never wanted, and knew would be be politically unsustainable: MacArthur threatened to destroy China unless it surrendered. While MacArthur felt total victory was the only honorable outcome, Truman was more pessimistic about his chances once involved in a land war in Asia, and felt a truce and orderly withdrawal from Korea could be a valid solution. Certainly, the USA could have used nuclear weapons (as McArthur suggested) to settle things, but in Truman's mind, that was the last, worst option, both internationally and domestically.
In fact, the failure to quickly resolve the Korean Conflict was a factor in Truman's decision not to run for President in 1952 (the 22nd Amendment did not apply to Truman: "...But this article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress..." the 22nd was proposed in 1947, ratified in 1951 - all while Truman was President) - his popularity had sagged in part due to the situation in Korea, not unlike the situation Lyndon Johnson faced in 1968, when the conflict in Vietnam was so problematic for him, due to its domestic unpopularity, and was a factor in his decision not to run for re-election at that time.
It would have been impossible for Truman to muster the political support necessary for an extended full blown war against China and possibly the USSR in such a domestic political climate, simply because of a "scare" on the other side of the world, and Truman knew it.
In the presidential campaign of 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who subsequently emerged victorious, included a promise to end the war in Korea: Many of his radio and television commercials discussed topics such as... ending the war in Korea. i.e : It was an unpopular war.
UN intervention and Armistice, engineered by Eisenhower's administration, was really the only viable option.
Upvote:2
In World War II, the United States had the assistance of the Soviet Union and China, countries with two of the largest armies in the world, that tied down large numbers of Axis troops while the U.S. administered the coup de grace.
In Korea, the United States was fighting both China and the Soviet Union, the former, "officially," the latter, tacitly, who provided T-34 tanks (then, among the best in the world) to the North Koreans, as well as diplomatic support. Not to mention MIGs, some of which may have been manned by Soviet pilots.
Upvote:3
What does win mean?
Did you achieve what you originally aimed to do? Then maybe U.S. and allied forces did "Win" as they achieved the mandate of Security Council Resolution 84 to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the attack".
References 1. UN Security Council, Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, 7 July 1950, S/RES/84 (1950), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1e85c.html [accessed 14 August 2013]
Upvote:4
Actually , given the dire situation in Korea when the US entered the war, with only a shrinking beachhead around Pusan left in South Korean hands, I venture that the US did win the Korean War.
We are misled by the hopes that MacArthur engendered with his amazing landing at Inchon. Unfortunately MacArthur's complete mismanagement of both supplies and his own perimeter ensured that the initial success of the landing was only ever going to be just that.
For North Korea to win, given the immense initial advantage they obtained, they would have to have made serious inroads on the starting border. After three hard years of fighting the border was essentially back to where it had begun, and South Korea became an economic success story for the North to pine at jealously.