How effective was the (Western) Allies bombing campaign over Germany in drawing down the Eastern Front Luftwaffe?

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There were two key effects of the strategic bombing campaign for the composition and deployment of the Luftwaffe. The first was the shift in production to emphasise fighters for defence, with a resultant decrease in bomber production (in March 1943 962 fighters and 757 bombers were produced; in December 1944 it was 2,630 fighters and 262 bombers), and thus reduction in offensive capability. The second was the shift of units to defend Germany. In the first half of 1943 45% of the Luftwaffe was on the Eastern Front, 33% was on the Western Front and/or defending Germany, 21% was in the Mediterranean. As the Combined Bomber Offensive started in earnest, by the end of 1943 54% of the Luftwaffe was on the Western Front and/or defending Germany; by the end of the following year it was 67%. The distribution of fighters was even more skewed, in the second half of 1944 less than one fifth of German fighters were on the Eastern Front.

Anti-aircraft defences also absorbed massive totals of personnel and weapons that could otherwise have been employed on the front; 889,000 personnel operating 14,400 heavy and 42,000 light guns, consuming one-fifth of all ammunition, half the production of the electronics industry, and one-third of optical equipment.

Figures are from Phillips Payson O'Brien's How The War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II and Richard Overy's The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945.

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