Does any real existent or genuine person end with parinibbana?

Does any real existent or genuine thing end with parinibbana?

Yes. Suffering. Suffering ends with parinibbana. Suffering is real and genuine. Buddha says now and in the past he had only taught suffering , its origination and its cessation. There are some undeclared or unanswered questions because they do not lead to cessation of suffering but that doesn't mean that they can not be answered. It is just that those questions are not conducive to the cessation of suffering. In SN 22.85 (the same sutta you quoted ) it is clear that it is the suffering which ends after nibbana:

“Reverend Yamaka, suppose they were to ask you: ‘When their body breaks up, after death, what happens to a perfected one, who has ended the defilements?’ How would you answer?” “Sir, if they were to ask this, I’d answer like this: ‘Reverend, form is impermanent. What’s impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended. Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness is impermanent. What’s impermanent is suffering. What’s suffering has ceased and ended.’ That’s how I’d answer such a question.”

Imo, the idea that the idea of "death" ("marana") is applicable to a Realised One is also part of the wrong view of Yamaka.

This being said, the termination of life (not "death") of a Realised One is described as follows (in my correct alternate translation):

‘Friend, form is impermanent; what is impermanent is unsatisfying (unsatisfactory); what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed away. Feeling… Perception… formations… consciousness is impermanent; what is impermanent is unsatisfying; what is unsatisfying has ceased and passed away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.

As for the question, it appears lost in the "spell" of translation and particularly the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" found in "saccato thetato tathāgate anupalabbhiyamāne" ("don’t acknowledge the Realized One as a genuine fact").

Since Sariputta instructs Yamaka at the beginning about "not-self" and since Sariputta provides an analogy about "not-self" at the end; the term "anupalabbhiyamāna" (which is found in this stock phrase in many suttas) probably needs to be examined deeply before answering this question.

Below is merely a guess but I guess the term māna must be important because it has the connotation of "self".

an + upalabbhati + māna

To conclude, I think the core message of the sutta is the Tathagata is not a self, person or being. Not being a "self", "death" does not happen at the termination of life. All that happens is the ending of the impermanent aggregates.

Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. By overcoming all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, why should he yearn?

MN 140

I think SN 22.86 is very similar but simpler.

I read it as saying:

• It is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates
• It's inappropriate to say that a Tathagata exists after death, doesn't exist, neither, or both -- IMO that makes it one of The unanswered questions -- instead pay attention to what the doctrine does say (e.g. that it is inappropriate to associate a "self" with the aggregates)

See also for example MN 22:

And how is a mendicant a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached? It’s when a mendicant has given up the conceit ‘I am’, cut it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, exterminated it, so it’s unable to arise in the future. That’s how a mendicant is a noble one with banner and burden put down, detached.

When a mendicant’s mind is freed like this, the gods together with Indra, Brahmā, and Pajāpati, search as they may, will not find anything that such a Realized One’s consciousness depends on. Why is that? Because even in the present life the Realized One is undiscoverable, I say. Though I speak and explain like this, certain ascetics and brahmins misrepresent me with the false, baseless, lying, untruthful claim: ‘The ascetic Gotama is an eradicator. He advocates the annihilation, eradication, and extermination of an existing being.’ I have been falsely misrepresented as being what I am not, and saying what I do not say. In the past, as today, what I describe is suffering and the cessation of suffering. This being so, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble the Realized One, he doesn’t get resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated.

Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate him, he doesn’t get thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. He just thinks: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’ So, mendicants, if others abuse, attack, harass, and trouble you, don’t make yourselves resentful, bitter, and emotionally exasperated. Or if others honor, respect, revere, or venerate you, don’t make yourselves thrilled, elated, and emotionally excited. Just think: ‘They do such things for what has already been completely understood.’

So, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. Feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. What do you think, mendicants? Suppose a person was to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and leaves in this Jeta’s Grove, or burn them, or do what they want with them. Would you think: ‘This person is carrying us off, burning us, or doing what they want with us?’” “No, sir. Why is that? Because that’s neither self nor belonging to self.” “In the same way, mendicants, give up what isn't yours. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness. And what isn’t yours? Form … feeling … perception … choices … consciousness isn’t yours: give it up. Giving it up will be for your lasting welfare and happiness.

I think there's more doctrine about "the support of consciousness" in SN 12.64:

Suppose there was a bungalow or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, or eastern side. When the sun rises and a ray of light enters through a window, where would it land?” “On the western wall, sir.” “If there was no western wall, where would it land?” “On the ground, sir.” “If there was no ground, where would it land?” “In water, sir.” “If there was no water, where would it land?” “It wouldn’t land, sir.” “In the same way, if there is no desire, relishing, and craving for solid food, consciousness does not become established there and doesn’t grow. …

See also for example Why is the Buddha described as trackless?

I'm not sure of ruben2020's answer, saying, "Before parinibbana, there was no self called Buddha that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana".

I think it's true to say "there was no self that has suddenly ceased to exist".

I'm not sure whether it's true (whether it's Theravada orthodoxy) to say "there was no self called Buddha" -- see How is it wrong to believe that a self exists, or that it doesn't? -- there is doctrine in the suttas including "it's inappropriate to associate the self with the aggregates", and "'I am' is a conceit" and "'am I?' is a result of attending inappropriately" -- but see also e.g. "Buddha never denies the existence of the self" (and that answer's being upvoted and disputed in comments) -- and there's an Abhidhamma answer which I think says it depends on context and convention.

I think you (the OP) have mistakenly assumed that the Pali Yamaka Sutta supports the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness that nothing is substantially real.

Actually, the Yamaka Sutta quote of the Bodhi translation indeed confirms emptiness, but it's the Theravada emptiness and not the Mahayana emptiness. And what is the Theravada emptiness? It's that all phenomena is empty of a self (see Suñña Sutta). Before parinibbana, there was no self (as in an eternal self or soul at the core of the Buddha's being) that has suddenly ceased to exist after parinibbana.

However, the Pali suttas do not explicitly support the Mahayana Madhyamika concept of emptiness. The Buddha's body was considered to be real but not constant or permanent. It is subject to change, arising and ceasing. But that does not mean that it's not real in Theravada.

To prove this, I'll quote Itivuttaka 44:

This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have heard: "Monks, there are these two forms of the Unbinding property. Which two? The Unbinding property with fuel remaining, & the Unbinding property with no fuel remaining.

And what is the Unbinding property with fuel remaining? There is the case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended, who has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden, attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released through right gnosis. His five sense faculties still remain and, owing to their being intact, he is cognizant of the agreeable & the disagreeable, and is sensitive to pleasure & pain. His ending of passion, aversion, & delusion is termed the Unbinding property with fuel remaining. (Note1)

And what is the Unbinding property with no fuel remaining? There is the case where a monk is an arahant whose fermentations have ended, who has reached fulfillment, finished the task, laid down the burden, attained the true goal, ended the fetter of becoming, and is released through right gnosis. For him, all that is sensed, being unrelished, will grow cold right here. This is termed the Unbinding property with no fuel remaining." (Note2)

Note1 and Note2 by Thanissaro Bhikkhu:
With fuel remaining (sa-upadisesa) and with no fuel remaining (anupadisesa): The analogy here is to a fire. In the first case, the flames are out, but the embers are still glowing. In the second, the fire is so thoroughly out that the embers have grown cold. The "fuel" here is the five aggregates. While the arahant is still alive, he/she still experiences the five aggregates, but they do not burn with the fires of passion, aversion, or delusion. When the arahant passes away, there is no longer any experience of aggregates here or anywhere else.

Next, to answer the question:

OP: So does this mean death is just like any moment in this very life where moment to moment nothing truly ends or changes because it doesn't truly exist in the first place?

Before and after the Buddha's final passing, all phenomena is empty of a self. The Buddha's five aggregates existed and was subject to change, arising and passing. Nibbana existed and does not change, arise or pass away. But the self (in the sense of an eternal self or soul at the core of our being) never existed at any time, in all phenomena, including the five aggregates and Nibbana. This is the interpretation according to Theravada.

Your interpretation appears to be different and based upon the concept of Mahayana emptiness.