Did the Soviet Union need both prongs to succeed at the Battle of Stalingrad?

Yes, the Soviets needed both prongs to succeed at the Battle of Stalingrad. Their goal was to encircle the German Sixth Army which occupied approximately 90% of the city.

The Battle for Stalingrad had raged since 17 July, 1942 and both sides were completely committed to winning control of the city that bore Stalin's name.

The Germans in and around the city were at the end of a supply line which was several hundred miles long. By attacking from both North and South, the Russians could use the Volga River which bordered the Eastern side of the city and served as the front line of the battle ground, to completely encircle the attacking German army.

Once the Germans were surrounded, the troops could no longer be supplied over land. Estimates vary but it is safe to say the daily supply requirements of food, fuel ammunition, etc. for an army of about 265,000 is somewhere between 600 and 700 tons. That's daily!

I guess it could be argued that even if one end of the Russian pincer attacks failed, the other could complete the encirclement--in twice the time. In the case of Stalingrad, that may have worked given Hitler's insisting that the army hold the position even when they could have made a breakout.

In the end the loss of Sixth Army, it's equipment, manpower and the fighting capabilities of such a force could never be justified by any short term gains made by occupying Russian troops in the battle. What a waste! On the Russian side, things worked exactly as planned.

To Oldcat replying to your comment of 3/26:

Please bear with me for another day as my intent is to get set up to correspond directly here within the next couple of days. I'm having a computer issue now that I must get repaired but I did want to forward you some info to read and consider regarding your comment.

The following information from the Army Historical Series is still used as part of the study material for officer training in our armed forces. It was compiled by historians, using records from both the German and Soviet armed forces.

The material contained was signed off on to be included in the publication by an advisory councel of armed forces representatives that included representatives of U.S. Army Training and Doctorine Command, U.S. Military Academy, The Citadel, U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College, The National Archives and Records Administration, The Adjutant General Center, U.S. Army War College, the Deputy Surgeon General and the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

The link is:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Decision/USA-EF-Decision-23.html

In case the link didn't come through properly, the publication is part of the Army Historical Series titled Hyperwar: Moscow to Stalingrad. The portion I ask you to review is chapter 23, pages 478 through 485.

The information about the Soviet forces, movements and strengths in this publication became available around the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain.

This read will allow you to see precisely the fighting status of Sixth Army, the Soviet forces and the original German relief effort for Stalingrad. It also gives a clear understanding of Hitler's reasoning on why to leave Sixth Army in Stalingrad versus allowing them to break out.

Based on my understanding of this, I respectfully disagree that the Germans did not have strength to break Sixth Army out. Nor would they have left most of their transport and heavy equipment behind. There was a plan in place for fuel and supplies for the army both before and after they were to link up with the relief forces.

If Hitler had allowed Manstein and Paulus to follow the breakout plan as it was originally written and approved, there is little doubt they could have linked up to the West of Stalingrad. Russian strength there was still relatively low just after the encirclement was completed. Even so, Hitler's waffling and tinkering with the plan and forces to be used changed times and the overall strength of the relief effort. So, we will never really know one way or the other...

I agree, it would have taken more than just Sixth Army to make the breakout. But that force, along with the relief forces originally planned and available, would likely have been sufficient to help create and hold an ally allowing for the withdrawl.

Here are the FACTS that we know.

1) The capture of Kalach was highly disruptive to German supply. through that city ran the main east-west road, and east-west railroad to Stalingrad. As it was, they could barely keep the 6th Army supplied with this city in their hands. If the Soviets had it but there had been a gap in the south, the Germans could have gotten SOME supplies through, but at a fraction of the normal rate, leaving the 6th Army on "short rations."

2) The German high command, beginning with Hitler, was committed to keeping the 6th Army in the "kettle" in and around Stalingrad. Even if there were a gap to the south, the Germans would not have used it for escape, preferring instead to open a route for resupply. Thus, the 6th Army would have remained "trapped" in and around Stalingrad.

3) The Germans never intended to use the 29th Motorized to keep open an escape route to the south (even though it temporarily served this purpose), preferring, instead, to use it (unsuccessfully) to stop the northern pincer. Once the Soviets reached Kalach from the north, this became moot.

4) Therefore, it would ultimately resolved itself into a battle between the resupplying German forces, and the progressively larger Soviet surrounding forces. This, in fact, was the case with the Manstein relief expedition in December.

On these facts, we could infer a few things:

1) The likelihood is that the Soviets would have closed the gap over time. At the very least, the Germans would have been engaged in a (probably losing) war of attrition to keep it open.

2) Leaving a gap open would not have been worst strategy for the Soviets. One German division took some 50% casualties in the north retreating WITHIN the Stalingrad pocket. The German high command rejected the alternative of a 50%-70% loss in retreat versus the 100% casualties actually suffered. As Sun Tzu wrote: "If you surround the enemy, leave an outlet; do not press an enemy that is cornered. These are the principles of warfare."