Has the side with less artillery ever won?

Question
Has the side with less artillery every won?

Battle of France at the beginning of WWII.

The allies had a huge quantitative advantage in artillery (+45%), tanks and men. Probable just tanks and artillery qualitatively. The French army while much larger than Germany's on paper was not as well trained.

Battle of France
British artillery strength amounted to 1,280 guns, Belgium fielded 1,338 guns, the Dutch 656 guns and France 10,700 guns, giving an Allied total of about 14,000 guns, 45 percent more than the German total. The French army was also more motorised than its opponent, which still relied on horses. Although the Belgians, British and Dutch had few tanks, the French had 3,254 tanks, larger than the German tank fleet.

Germany was able to mitigate Frances superior armaments with superior tactics. France distributed their tanks and artillery and used them to support it's infantry which were deployed to static defensive positions. Germany massed their tanks and artillery to achieve a localized superiority. The German infantry was used to support fast moving tanks, and artillery was used to open the door for the tanks. The Germans also used close air support to coordinate with their ground forces. German tanks had a more efficient crew organization and all of German tanks had radios where as the allies only heavy tanks carried radios.

So the allies had a better equipped army arrayed against the Germans yet still got out maneuvered and lost in a route.

First and Second Persian Gulf wars

Iraq had more and better artillery than did the United States and it's allies. Iraq even had classes of soviet motorized artillery which the allies had no corresponding guns for.

Coarse the reason the United States and it's allies didn't have artillery is because on the modern battle field artillery doesn't survive very long. You shoot it once and enemy radar can pick out the firing location and throw back a handful of anti personnel missiles to that location. So the Iraqi artillery wasn't a strategic advantage it would have been in WWII.

Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War with Hezbollah

Israel used fighter bombers, tanks with infantry and artillery in support. Hezbollah had no artillery just Russian and American anti tank and personnel missiles. Hezbollah fought from tunnels prepared in advance. When Israel used their artillery Hezbollah ducked down into their tunnels, only to pop up with their missiles when Israel sent in their tanks and infantry. It's the only war where Israel left it's opponent in the field and withdrew. Israel lost more tanks in that action than the US lost in both gulf wars.

In the case of the Peninsular War, almost every Allied victory was an example of the side with less artillery winning. Throughout the campaign the French had a material advantage in both numbers of guns and weight of shot, which reflected a difference of opinion about how artillery was used.

The Duke [of Wellington] preferred to work with small and movable units, placed in well-chosen spots, and kept dark till the critical moment, rather than with the enormous lines of guns that Bonaparte believed in.

^{A History of the Peninsular War, pg 121}

The ratio of artillery to infantry in the Allied army seldom greatly exceeded one gun to 1000 men, but was as high as eight to 1000 in French armies in Central Europe and sometimes reached four to 1000 in Spain.

^{Wellington in the Peninsula, pg 136}

A clear example of a victory with inferior artillery is the Battle of Bussaco, where the Anglo-Portuguese army under Wellington had 60 field guns while the French under Massena had almost twice as many (Wikipedia quotes 112 guns, while Weller gives 114). As he regularly did, Wellington made good use of the terrain, in this battle, to shield the bulk of his forces from French artillery fire in the early stages.

Wellington showed as clearly at Busaco as in any future battle his ideas on the proper use of artillery. In direct contradiction to the Napoleonic theory, and in opposition to his own artillery officers, he avoided any massive concentration of fire. He preferred to employ his guns in relatively small numbers, a battery or two at most, at effective range right in line with his infantry. The success of this system over the corps concentrations used by the French was in part responsible for the 'under-gunned' condition of the Allied army in the future.

^{Wellington in the Peninsula, pg 136}

Sources:
A History of the Peninsular War, Vol 1, Charles Oman (Oxford, 1902)
Wellington in the Peninsula, Jac Weller (Pen & Sword, 1992)