What is the Reformed Protestant view of Theodicy?

The question has two false presumptions.

1. That there is a general view on this topic in reformed protestantism like a dogma.
2. That there is a general answer to this question.

Suffering is very individual. A thing, that might cause suffering in one person, might leave another person unaffected. So, if you ask the question, why others are suffering, it is much more difficult to answer, than if you ask, why you are suffering yourself. There is no absolute scale of suffering, at least I don't know.

Furthermore, you can't answer this question in general, as the answer to "why does God let happen an earthquake" can look differently than "why does John get cancer".

There can be a general answer to this question, but it is far from being sure, that it exists and very likely it doesn't. Though humans would like to have a simple plain answer in most cases. The last point is also the reason, why people prefer a wrong explanation over none.

Here follows a short extract from a sermon on the subject of evil, given by R.C. Sproul, who I believe was a Reformed, Protestant minister and author. He points out that “the problem of evil” is a far greater problem to atheists than it is to Christians.

The "problem of evil" presupposes objective moral values, which requires a transcendent source. So using "evil" as an argument against God presupposes him. Without God, there can be no evil, only a material world governed by un-designed chance or blind fate. So the atheist worldview has the real "problem with evil". If evil is purely subjective, then it really doesn't exist. You cannot make an objective moral judgement on a materialistic universe, even in the face of the most tragic events like the starvation of little children or genocide.

He then goes on to address the challenge that if God allows evil then he is malevolent and impotent:

In many instances God reveals a good purpose behind the evil that God ordains. The Bible shows us many clues. The kidnapping and enslavement of Joseph was a direct act of God (Genesis 45:7), yet while Joseph's brothers meant it for evil, "...God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive...". (Genesis 50:20).

Sproul then turns the tables on those who accuse God of being responsible for evil:

The most evil act in history was the death of God's own Son, delivered into the hand of wicked men according to the "determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" (Acts 2:23), for all these did nothing but "what the hand and counsel of God had decreed" (Acts 4:27-28). Yet the good that has come about by the evil act is wondrous indeed, the redemption of poor, deformed sinners, deserving of God's wrath, into adopted sons who have the promise of an inheritance. (Covenant Theology) Source: https://www.monergism.com/topics/evil

I found a related question I asked in May 2019 on the subject of God’s permissive will and his efficient will. This may be helpful (or not) but I reckon this section of a very good answer I received is worth contemplating:

Theodicy: voluntas efficiens (efficient will) VS. voluntas permittens (permitted will)

• If God’s will must account for all creation, what about evil, Satan, and hell?

• Voluntas efficiens: the “efficient will” refers to those aspects of His will who receive His full affirmation. Efficiens also means to create, cause, or produce. So this is the product of His creation which obeys Him perfectly and gets his affirmation.

• Voluntas permittens: the “permitted will” refers to the part of creation which doesn’t get His affirmation. He still has willed its existence, but He isn’t pleased with it. He permits it to exist because it serves His purposes (e.g., Satan).

Source: What is the Reformed Protestant understanding of God's Permissive Will, His Sovereign or Decretive Will and Efficacious Will?

The author below is of the Reformed Protestant school and referred to theodicy in this way:

"Shifting the focus from our own sin to God (ontology and metaphysics) is one of the sources of dualism, ancient and modern. We must shift the ground back to our covenantal transgression rather than ontological fault. Romans chapters 1 to 3 show that in Adam we have all become false witnesses – which is a form of evil, even if we are unaware that we are false witnesses." Pilgrim Theology M Horton, pp 144-5 (Zondervan, 2011)

If God, in his foreknowledge, had been intimidated by the realisation that some of his creatures would abuse his good gifts and thus give rise to evil, then would that have prevented him from providing those good gifts? If so, then God would not be God, for the very possibility of evil would have stopped him! But because God is God, not even the vilest evil of any of his creatures will thwart his purpose to provide good gifts. God will overcome all evil, and the victory of the cross and the resurrection show that evil has already been judged; the execution of God's righteous judgment on evil is inevitable. Meanwhile, evil creatures do even more evil, but God has a timetable and he will be proven right by the end of it all. Evil is an attempted negation of God's good.

Epicurus was an Athenian philosopher who died in 270 B.C. and he raised the question of evil and God. He is attributed as the one who formed this question, called the problem of theodicy. Upon examination, however, it constitutes a double non-sequitur.

A – Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. That is not a sufficient basis for identifying God (or anyone else) as malevolent. He doesn't account for God having a higher purpose or reason to allow evil. He seems to presume that a benevolent God would swoop down and stop ALL evil, or render us unable to do anything bad. Thus Epicurus presumes God's function is to stop evil. But human beings don't know everything, thus our ability to judge whether or not the evil is justifiable is suspect. In the end, we can’t rule out that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing some evil to exist.

B – Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? That’s a different sort of non-sequitur. There is no obvious relationship between the first question and the second. That is: assuming that evil has an origin, there is no reason to believe that origin is different for each of these cases. Yet Epicurus fails to define what evil is. He needs to clarify that before he can say anything!

The answer is simple: God is both able and willing, but that has no relevance regarding the origin or the continuation of evil. God has, on occasions, demonstrated his ability to stamp on persistent evil but has always waited a long time first, to allow people to repent and to be spared his wrath. But guess what – people who hate God then accuse him of being unjust in stamping out persistent evil!

It is God’s will that all evil will, eventually, be removed from the cosmos, but in his way, at his time, to settle issues of good and evil once and for all. Evil was triumphed over at the cross, and by the empty tomb, but those who walk in darkness cannot see that. The issue has actually already been settled.

Theodicy fails to take on board what God has revealed of himself and his dealings with the evil that is displayed by both humans and demons. Theodicy picks and chooses from the Bible without taking it as a whole. It looks at the problem of evil purely from the human point of view, which is that of sinful, fallen humanity that is guilty of evil itself. As Horton points out:

"...there is now, because of sin, only the expectation of death and judgment. [God's] law announces this to everyone who is under it, whether in its written form or as it has been inscribed on the conscience, "so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God" (Ro 3:19).

Because of this original covenantal relation and revelation, there is, as in Aldo Gargani's vivid expression, 'the nostalgia for God of every living person.' And this nostalgia drives us to idolatry and suppression of the truth - to a theology of glory that judges by appearances, rather than to the arms of God through the revelation of his Son... Thinking that their problem was merely shame rather than guilt, Adam and Eve covered themselves with loincloths, and ever since then we have found ourselves incapable of accepting - or rather, unwilling to accept - the radical diagnosis of our own depravity. We can talk about evil outside of us - the 'others', whoever they may be; evil places, structures, forces, and principles. But, like the religious leaders whom Jesus challenged, we refuse to locate evil within ourselves (Mt 12:33-37; 15:10-20; 23:25-28)." (Ibid. pp146-7)

Those last 3 sentences sum up the problem of the Epicurean philosophy of theodicy.