What were General Johnston's options during the Atlanta campaign?

Impossible to know if Lincoln would have won reelection but I agree that if Johnston had been in command of The Army of TN earlier, things would have been much more difficult in TN and N GA. Sherman was a great general with an aggressive warfighting style while Johnston, being more experienced, defensively inclined but definitely not afraid to fight was a good scrap. I believe I saw somewhere above that Johnston had no plan. Not true. While in N GA, he had multiple preplanned defensive positions built farther south. If not relieved and given Forrest in Sherman's rear, whether Johnston climbed into ATL or just the GA Militia manning it and Johnston maneuvering around Sherman, Billy would have had some problems. BTW, my GG Grandfather was with Sherman. Rob in ATL lol

In asking this question, my big fear was that some Southerner, particularly Georgian, would answer based on a knowledge of the terrain around Atlanta and northern Georgia that e.g. "Johnston would have done far better to stop Sherman around Kennesaw Mountain", or "The ground around Atlanta is much better for offense than defense, so Hood did the "right" thing, even though he lost." Since no such answer was forthcoming, I'll follow my own instincts in using historical and statistical analysis.

The North had a better than two to one advantage in population, which translated into a two to one advantage in troops, (even allowing for higher enlistment rates of Southerners). When led by a capable commander such as Sherman, the Northern forces could win, albeit with difficulty, with such an advantage. That was basically the situation Johnston was facing when he took over the army near the Tennessee border. The ratio of Union to Confederate forces at the beginning of the campaign was something like 99,000 to 53,000, close enough to 2 to 1. Hence Johnston had to act circumspectly and retreat, while extracting the highest price for land lost.

When both sides got to Atlanta, the ratio of Northern to Southern troops was something like 74,000 to 60,000, or just under 5 to 4. These were MUCH better odds than Confederate commanders typically enjoyed. When you consider the troubles that Sherman would have in city fighting in Atlanta, plus Johnston's advantage of "interior lines," the Southerners were basically at parity. While there were no guarantees, Johnston had to like those odds.

When Hood took over, Sherman's force was actually subdivided into three smaller armies, averaging 25,000 men led by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield. Hood's tactics were to try to "pick off" each of these three armies one by one, as they maneuvered in (for them) unfamiliar ground around Atlanta. In the "best case" scenario, he might have succeed in destroying one of those three 25,000 men armies, losing perhaps 12,000 of his own men, or half as many. That would have put his army at parity with Sherman's, forcing the latter to retreat from Atlanta. Given Hood's subsequent conduct, that would just have allowed him to "waste" this advantage further north, as he in fact did after the Atlanta campaign.

What actually happened was that Hood was repulsed in all three "pick-off" attempts, with a roughly two to one loss ratio (roughly 25,000 to 13,000). That reduced Hood's army to 35,000 men and Sherman's to just over 60,000, almost restoring the North's original advantage of nearly two to one. Next to the utter destruction of his army, this was the worst possible result for Hood and the South.

In chess terms, the Confederates enjoyed "draw odds," that is, the South wins all ties. In his characteristic "playing to win or lose," Hood squandered that advantage. Johnston may well have "drawn" at Atlanta, and depending on what happened elsewhere, that might just have been enough for a Southern win.

With the primacy of the tactical defense and the Confederacy's paucity of manpower resources, perhaps Joseph Johnston should have been in command of the Army of Tennessee a lot sooner than just after the disaster at Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863). If Rosecrans would have had to try to maneuver against Johnston in central Tennessee instead of against Braxton Bragg, perhaps the Union Army of the Cumberland would have been ground down long before it reached north Georgia and would have been destroyed at Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863). More likely, it would not have reached that far south without significant losses and Rosecrans getting fired long before the Chickamauga disaster.

Time was what the Confederacy needed alongside conservation of precious manpower resources. The tactical and strategic defensive would have provided both, in the west because there was enormous space to trade for time, in Virginia because there was far less room for maneuver and the higher ratio of force-to-space would have ground down the Army of the Potomac much more effectively than a "Pickett's Charge" or Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville could ever deliver. James Longstreet had the only rational formula for the strategic offensive: Pair it with the tactical defensive, interposing the Army of Northern Virginia on ground which the Army of the Potomac would have to attack, not defend; in other words, the Atlanta Campaign in reverse, with the ANV threatening Baltimore, Philadelphia, or D.C. itself, forcing the Army of the Potomac onto the offensive, but on good defensive ground for the Army of Northern Virginia.

Back to Johnston in the Atlanta Campaign, this translates to Johnston's tactical and strategic defensive being applied long before the Union Army was using Chattanooga as a base and threatening north Georgia and Atlanta. It means applying tactical and strategic defense in central Tennessee, slowly giving ground and grinding the Union army down. We all know that in a democracy there is an inverse relationship between casualty figures and support for a war. With a strong peace movement in the Union by 1864, how difficult would it have been for Lincoln to win re-election if there was stalemate in Virginia and central or east Tennessee by election day?

Johnston's strategy was clearly correct. He traded space for time, and whittled away at the attacking army. This was what the entire Confederacy needed to do.

As to Hood's policy: the historical rule of thumb, going back centuries, was that an attacker needed to outnumber a defender 3 to 1 to be able to carry a strongly defended position. During the Civil War era, with rifles and Minie balls and trenches, the balance swung more strongly to the defender than at any time in military history. Hood's idea to attempt frontal assaults with odds of 4 to 5 is indefensible. Sherman probably would have had Atlanta anyway: but there was no need to just give it away. Johnston would have held it longer; and if he'd had to withdraw, he would have gotten out with more men.

The issue of timing is crucial. Most historians credit the fall of Atlanta as an important factor in Lincoln's re-election win. If Johnston had held Atlanta for another two months, maybe the election would have gone differently. Then the Confederacy might have been able to negotiate peace terms with the new administration.

Perhaps not. Inauguration wasn't until March; Lincoln would still have been Commander-in-Chief. In real life, Sherman had already burned Columbia and Grant was just a few weeks from taking Petersburg, on the date of Lincoln's second inauguration. But would the administration have been able to conduct the same war, in a lame duck situation? It is unknowable; but probably not. Lincoln had a hard time keeping his coalition in line even when he had the full weight of his office.

By 1864 this was the Confederacy's only remaining hope, to stave off military disaster. Hood and Jefferson Davis squandered it. It's probably too strong to say that Davis snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, since victory was by no means certain even if Johnston had held off Sherman for longer. But he hastened the Confederacy's fall.